

Network Analysis:

The Hidden Structures behind the Webs We Weave

17-213 / 17-668

Power and Centrality in Social Exchange

Thursday, September 25, 2025

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Quick Recap – Last Tuesday's Lecture

Power, influence, prominence of an individual is relational: They originate from relationships that the individual has with others

Network centrality quantifies this relational view of power

- Degree centrality
- Closeness centrality
- Betweenness centrality
- Eigenvector centrality

Centrality measures tend to be correlated (e.g., degree and closeness), but they quantify different facets / dimensions of power

Where Centrality Breaks: Positive Sum vs. Zero-Sum Relations

The Social Exchange Perspective

All human interactions are “**exchanges**” that are social by nature

- Market exchange of goods/services
- Non-market exchange: gift, favors, advice, respect, emotion, invitation, etc.
- Interdependence (needs/wants) drives social interaction in the form of exchange

Trust is the basis of all exchanges (and social interactions)

- “How can I be sure that they won’t cheat?”
- Market vs. non-market exchanges use different mechanisms to solve the problem of trust
- **What** are they?

The Social Exchange Perspective

Market exchange:

- Terms of exchange: Negotiation
- Time frame: Immediate (spot market)
- Enforcement: Institutional sanctions, formal law
- Problem of trust: solved by central enforcers (state)
- Zero-sum: A's profit is B's cost

Non-market exchange:

- Terms of exchange: Reciprocity
- Time frame: Unspecified
- Enforcement: Social pressure, norms
- Problem of trust: solved by the decentralized collective (reputation, ostracism)
- Not clearly zero-sum: A's profit does not directly mean B's cost

The Social Exchange Perspective

Social ties we use to construct networks and the network measures we apply implicitly assume social interactions to resemble non-market exchange

- Reciprocity
- Social pressure discourages norm violation (trust from triadic closure)
- Power and influence grows with having more exchange partners (centrality)
- Not clearly zero-sum: A's social support to B can be reciprocated at a later time in-kind or with different resources (e.g., labor, status, loyalty)

Positive vs. Negative Connections

Network measures cannot be blindly applied to any network

Example: The Interdependence between ties

- one exchange relation is contingent on the (non)exchange in a neighboring relation
- **positive connections**: Flow of resources from $B \rightarrow A \rightarrow C$. C can receive resources from A only if B transfers them to A.
- **negative connections**: zero-sum relations. A's exchange with B implies that A does not need to exchange with C (B's gain is C's loss)


Positive vs. Negative Connections

Positive Connections Positive sum relation



Example: supply chain

Negative Connections Zero-sum relation



Example: One buyer and two competing sellers

Positive vs. Negative Connections

Degree centrality predicts “power” in networks of positive connections

Question: Does centrality predict power in networks of negative connections (i.e., zero-sum relations)? **Why?**

Power-Dependence Theory

For negative connections:

- If B depends on A more than A depends on B $\rightarrow$ A has that much more power over B ([Emerson, 1962](#))

$$P_{AB} = D_{BA}$$


- These dependencies (hence power) stem from positions in the exchange network

So, does centrality and power-dependence logic make the same predictions about powerful positions in negatively connected networks?

Centrality in Negatively Connected Exchange Networks

Exchange network experiment by Cook et al. ([1983](#))

1(a) 4 person network
(two positions)



Lines: Exchange opportunities

- **Solid lines:** Two people negotiate how to split \$24 (larger pot)
- **Dashed lines:** Negotiate how to split \$8 (smaller pot)

Alphabets: Exchange positions


- Same alphabet positions (e.g., B₁ and B₂) are identical

Local knowledge: Participants do not know the exchange network (only the ties that they have)

Centrality in Negatively Connected Exchange Networks

Exchange network experiment by Cook et al. ([1983](#))

1(a) 4 person network
(two positions)



Network 1(a): A can exchange with only one among B₁, B₂, and B₃ in one round

A and a partner in position B can negotiate how to split \$24 (solid line)


B₁ and B₂ can negotiate how to split \$8 (dashed line)

Negatively connected: In a round, If A chooses B₁ as partner, then B₂ and B₃ cannot exchange with A

Predictions of Power According to Centrality

Exchange network experiment by Cook et al. ([1983](#))

1(a) 4 person network
(two positions)



Power: Measured by the total points that an occupant of a position earns through multiple rounds of exchanges


Centrality: A is the most central in terms of **weighted** degree, closeness, and betweenness centrality

Therefore, centrality predicts that power should be $A > B1 = B2 = B3$

Predictions of Power According to Power-Dependence Theory

Power-dependence theory Prediction

I(a) 4 person network
(two positions)



If B1 exchanges with B2 or B3 $\rightarrow$ \$4

If B1 exchanges with A:

- any point above \$4 is more beneficial

If B1 suggests to A for an equal split (\$12:\$12)

B2 and B3 are in the same situation as B1

They will offer equal split to A


B1, B2, and B3 all **depend** on A to get a better outcome than \$4

In turn, A can bargain with all three for a better deal

Q: At equilibrium, what is the maximum amount A can get?

Predictions of Power According to Power-Dependence Theory

I(a) 4 person network
(two positions)



At equilibrium: A's expected payoff: \$20, B's expected payoff: \$4

B position is dependent on A position to maximize payoff
→ **A's power over B is equal to B's dependence on A**

Power: $A > B1=B2=B3$


(Same as centrality)

Predictions of Power According to Centrality


Exchange network experiment by Cook et al. ([1983](#))

D is the most central in terms of **closeness** and (weighted) **betweenness** centrality for all configurations
Power: $D > E > F$


1 (c) 5 person network
(three positions)




1 (d) 7 person network
(three positions)



1 (e) 10 person network
(three positions)




1 (f) 13 person network
(three positions)




Predictions of Power According to Centrality

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
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
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1 (f) 13 person network
(three positions)



D is the most central in terms of **closeness and** (weighted) **betweenness** centrality for all configurations

Power: $D > E > F$

D and **E** have same **degree** centrality in 1c and 1e


Power: $D = E > F$

D has larger degree than **E** in 1d
Power: $D > E > F$

E has larger degree than **F** in 1f
Power: $E > D > F$


Predictions of Power According to Power-Dependence Theory

1 (c) 5 person network
(three positions)




Q: Who is the most powerful according to power-dependence theory?


1 (d) 7 person network
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1 (e) 10 person network
(three positions)




1 (f) 13 person network
(three positions)




Predictions of Power According to Power-Dependence Theory


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
1 (d) 7 person network
(three positions)



1 (e) 10 person network
(three positions)



1 (f) 13 person network
(three positions)



Q: Who is the most powerful according to power-dependence theory?

F is dependent on E for higher payoff

→ E can ask for \$20 to F

→ E can also ask D for a “price match” (\$20)

D cannot earn more than \$4 because each E can exchange with their F for equivalent payoff

D’s and F’s expected payoffs will be \$4

Power: $E > D = F$

Experimental Evidence

Experiment designed with network 1c

Recruited 100 university students

27 transaction rounds

Negotiate with connected partners each round

Only one transaction per round per person

- negatively connected

Transactions are not revealed to others

1(c) 5 person network
(three positions)




TABLE 1

EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS:

MEAN PROFIT OF PERSON E PER EXCHANGE WITH D AND WITH F
in NETWORK 1c BY EXCHANGE INCENTIVE AND TRIAL BLOCK

EXCHANGE INCENTIVE AND EXCHANGE PARTNER	TRIAL BLOCKS		
	1	2	3
Low:			
D	13.80 (4.13)	12.69 (4.26)	13.32 (4.25)
F	13.27 (3.10)	14.78* (2.77)	15.44** (2.96)
High:			
D	12.90 (3.71)	13.72 (4.40)	17.19** (5.26)
F	15.52** (2.38)	16.66** (2.10)	16.91** (2.46)
Combined:			
D	13.35 (3.95)	13.21 (4.36)	15.26** (5.16)
F	14.40** (2.99)	15.72** (2.63)	16.18** (2.82)

NOTE —The profit obtained by D and F in negotiations with E can be obtained by subtracting the values in this table (E's profit) from 24. Standard deviations are in parentheses

* Significantly greater than 12 ($P < .05$)

** Significantly greater than 12 ($P < .01$)

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
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1(c) 5 person network
(three positions)



Why was E's power realized clearly in the last 9 rounds (Block 3)?

Why didn't E reach theoretical maximum (20 points)?

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Simulation Evidence


TABLE 2

SIMULATION RESULTS:
MEAN PROFIT OF THE POWERFUL (E) PER "EXCHANGE" WITH D AND WITH F IN
FOUR REPLICATIONS VARYING NETWORK SIZE


FIGURE PART, SIZE OF NETWORK, AND E'S EXCHANGE PARTNER	TRIAL BLOCKS					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
1c, 5 actor:						
D	12.79a (2.57)	15.36 (2.76)	17.15 (2.98)	18.60 (2.11)	19.31 (1.67)	19.55 (1.44)
F	14.71 (2.64)	16.33 (2.76)	17.83 (2.56)	19.08 (1.86)	19.86 (1.42)	19.91a (1.26)
1d, 7 actor:						
D	10.56b (3.02)	13.03 (3.07)	15.00 (2.81)	16.54 (2.32)	17.64 (1.68)	18.47 (1.43)
F	14.33 (2.95)	15.31 (2.34)	16.64 (2.40)	17.79 (1.93)	18.66 (1.38)	19.06 (.97)
1e, 10 actor:						
D	13.99 (2.89)	17.69 (2.37)	19.65 (1.07)	20.06 (.58)	20.11 (.55)	20.11 (.54)
F	16.35 (2.16)	18.68 (1.35)	19.86 (.59)	20.11 (.42)	20.22 (.43)	20.01 (.39)
1f, 13 actor:						
D	14.50a (3.18)	19.56c (2.10)	20.42 (.86)	20.63 (.66)	20.50 (.64)	20.43 (.55)
F	17.18 (1.69)	20.06 (.74)	20.67 (.57)	20.87 (.59)	20.69 (.52)	20.58 (.49)

NOTE.—These values represent the average profit E obtained in "exchanges" with D and F, with 24 units of profit available for each "exchange"; therefore D's and F's average profit equals 24 - E's profit in each case. Each trial block contained nine trials. Cell values are based on the simulation of 50 groups; in an occasional group, however, E did not complete an "exchange" in a given trial block. Cell means labeled "a" are based on 49 groups, that labeled "b" has 47 groups, that labeled "c" has 42 groups per cell; all others have 50 groups per cell. Standard deviations are in parentheses.


1(c) 5 person network
(three positions)




1(d) 7 person network
(three positions)



1(e) 10 person network
(three positions)




1(f) 13 person network
(three positions)



Zero-Sum Relations

Centrality does not accurately capture power in networks of zero-sum relations
Then, centrality might not predict power in a society where people believe social life is zero-sum



*100 = "Wealth can grow so there's enough for everyone"; 0 = "People can only get rich at the expense of others"

Sources: FT analysis of World Values Survey; Maddison Project database

Based on *Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Divides* (Chinoy et al., 2023)

FT graphic by John Burn-Murdoch / @jburnmurdoch

© FT

Power Centrality: A Synthesized Measure

Incorporating Negative Connections

Phillip Bonacich (inventor of eigenvector centrality)

- Proposes modification to eigenvector centrality ([Bonacich 1987](#))

Insight: The source of power comes from

- **Connections to powerful actors** (positive connections)
- **Connections to dependent actors** (negative connections)
 - Those who do not have alternative options for exchange

Eigenvector centrality squarely captures power in positive connections

$$\lambda C_E(i) = \sum_j A_{ij} C_E(j)$$

A modified measure should make a node central to the extent that neighbors are less central

Bonacich Power Centrality

Beta parameter determines the importance of the centrality of the neighbors

Beta > 0: higher neighbor centrality increases my centrality

→ [Connections to powerful actors](#)

Beta < 0: higher neighbor centrality decreases my centrality

→ [Connections to dependent actors](#)

Beta = 0: Degree centrality

Eigenvector Centrality

$$\lambda C_E(i) = \sum_j A_{ij} C_E(j)$$



Power Centrality

$$c_i(\beta) = \sum_j (\alpha + \beta c_j) A_{ji}$$


Bonacich Power Centrality

Example:


$$\beta = .25$$



$$\beta = -.25$$



1(c) 5 person network
(three positions)




Bonacich Power Centrality


TABLE 3
CENTRALITY SCORES FOR FOUR NETWORKS FOR SELECTED VALUES OF β

POSITION β	NETWORK											
	1c			1d			1e			1f		
	D	E	F	D	E	F	D	E	F	D	E	F
-.5	.00	1.58	.00	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
-.4	.73	1.45	.36	1.62	1.08	.54	-1.00	1.67	-.33	-1.72	1.53	-.57
-.3	.97	1.34	.49	1.62	1.08	.54	.36	1.81	.12	-.55	2.03	-.18
-.2	1.09	1.27	.54	1.62	1.08	.54	1.00	1.67	.33	.44	2.05	.15
-.1	1.15	1.23	.58	1.62	1.08	.54	1.30	1.55	.43	1.01	1.91	.34
0	1.20	1.20	.60	1.62	1.08	.54	1.46	1.46	.49	1.33	1.78	.44
.1	1.22	1.17	.61	1.62	1.08	.54	1.57	1.40	.52	1.52	1.67	.51
.2	1.25	1.16	.62	1.62	1.08	.54	1.63	1.36	.54	1.65	1.59	.55
.3	1.26	1.14	.63	1.62	1.08	.54	1.68	1.33	.56	1.74	1.53	.58
.4	1.27	1.13	.64	1.62	1.08	.54	1.72	1.30	.57	1.80	1.48	.60
.5	1.28	1.12	.64	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...


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
1 (d) 7 person network
(three positions)



1 (e) 10 person network
(three positions)



1 (f) 13 person network
(three positions)



Robustness vs. Fragility

Creative Variations on Power Centrality

[Bothner et al.](#) applies the recursive intuition in power centrality

One's structural fragility is a function of the fragility of the alters

Insight:

- Fragility roughly means too much reliance/dependence on few people
- The position is even more fragile if those few people are also in fragile positions

Structural Fragility

Herfindahl Index (H): Measures concentration

$$H_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n-1} d_{ij}$$

$$d_{ij} = \left[\frac{x_{ij}}{\sum_{j=1}^{n-1} x_{ij}} \right]^2$$

Proportion squared

x_{ij} Tie weight of i - j edge

Example:

$$[1, 2, 3] \rightarrow (1/6)^2 + (2/6)^2 + (3/6)^2 = 14/36$$

$$[2, 2, 2] \rightarrow (2/6)^2 + (2/6)^2 + (2/6)^2 = 12/36$$

The more that i 's weight is concentrated to fewer alters, i 's fate is greatly affected by those few

Structural Fragility

Use the herfindahl index matrix instead of the adjacency matrix


$$d_{ij} = \left[\frac{x_{ij}}{\sum_{j=1}^{n-1} x_{ij}} \right]^2$$

$$F_i(a, b) = \sum_j (a + bF_j) d_{ij}$$

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
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Creative Applications of Power Centrality

Example: University department prestige and fragility in the network of faculty hiring

PhD faculty job placement network is hierarchical



[Clauset et al. 2015](#)

Fig. 1 Prestige hierarchies in faculty hiring networks.

(**Top**) Placements for 267 computer science faculty among 10 universities, with placements from one particular university highlighted. Each arc (u,v) has a width proportional to the number of current faculty at university v who received their doctorate at university u ($u \neq v$). (**Bottom**) Prestige hierarchy on these institutions that minimizes the total weight of “upward” arcs, that is, arcs where v is more highly ranked than u .

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“A fragilely located department is one that trades scholars [faculty hiring between department i and j] with a limited set of departments that are similarly restricted in their set of exchange partners (Bothner et al. 2010).”

Creative Variations on Power Centrality

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TABLE 7
MODELS PREDICTING DEPARTMENTAL PRESTIGE IN BURRIS'S
PHD EXCHANGE NETWORK

	1	2	3	4
Social capital	1.118 (.069)**	1.105 (.067)**	.747 (.045)**	1.068 (.078)**
Fragility ($c = 0$)				-.085 (.093)
Fragility ($c = .99$)		-.101 (.039)*	-.093 (.036)*	-.096 (.039)*
Article publications	.072 (.051)	.067 (.049)	.070 (.052)	.064 (.049)
Citations	.005 (.010)	.005 (.010)	.026 (.053)	.005 (.010)
Research grants	-.000 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.008 (.045)	-.000 (.003)
Weighted article publications ...	.180 (.082)*	.176 (.079)*	.112 (.051)*	.165 (.080)*
Book publications	.245 (.090)**	.217 (.088)*	.114 (.046)*	.232 (.089)*
Constant	-.401 (.150)**	-.294 (.151)	-.000 (.034)	-.138 (.227)
N	94	94	94	94
R^2	.89	.90	.90	.90

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Question: What do $c=0$ and $c=0.99$ mean? (c is the beta weight in power centrality)

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Summary

Different centrality measures for different aspects of power

Ask if centrality is the right way to think about power, given the nature of the tie (positive vs. negative connections)

Centrality does not quantify power accurately in negatively connected exchange networks

Power-dependence theory gives better prediction

Bonacich power centrality modifies eigenvector centrality to measure centrality in negative connections

Creative variation: Structural fragility